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CIVIL AUGMENTATION OF U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE
"Our Nation's cause has always been bigger than our Nation's defense." George W. Bush "The symptoms of a potential decline in readiness exist within the United States Army today."
1 As the Army's leadership constantly looks to establish a higher tooth to tail ratio, combat service support (CSS) units have always been and will continue to be the major bill payer. The impact of sacrificing service support force structure to maintain or increase combat arms end strength is a potential void in the capability to provide uninterrupted CSS to the warfighter. To date, the Army's bridge to this dilemma is an increased reliance on Department of the Army civilian (DAC) and contractor support to perform necessary logistical functions in support of military operations. As the Army looks to the civilian sector to perform vital military functions, it must carefully monitor the strategic impact this option can have on future operations, particularly in light of a changing warfighting doctrine and the global war on terrorism.
The purpose of this research paper is to examine past and current concepts of employing Specifically, much in part due to technological advances, political decisions not to employ reserve forces, dollar savings studies, and a host of other issues, the civilian workforce's role on the battlefield has become more critical to the success of military operations than ever before in American military history. However, the changing nature of warfare; hence doctrinal changes should cause us to re-look the traditional methods of employing civilian contractors and DACs on the modern battlefield. After providing a historical perspective and the important role of the combatant commander and staff in identifying logistics requirements during deliberate and crisis action planning, this research will address force management concerns regarding the employment of DAC and contractor employees on the future battlefield, from the initial phases of planning for civilian logistics support, through to deployment into a theater of operations, and ending in post conflict redeployment. Lastly, the author will assess the Army's strategic planning efforts with regard to the risks assumed when employing civilians on the battlefield.
This research paper in no way questions the patriotism and loyalties of DACs and contract employees. Instead, it attempts to address some of the challenges confronted by the Army commander in the wake of a changing warfighting doctrine.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
This portion of the research is to provide an historic chronology of the employment of contractors in support of military operations. Much of it is derived from a single source, Dr.
Charles R. Shrader's "Contractors on the Battlefield," Landpower Essay Series. While its intent is to offer the reader an appreciation for the types of military logistics support provided throughout United States history, it is important to understand the fact that as warfare becomes increasingly mobile as a result of technological improvements in weapon system design, the greater the apparent need for contractors on the battlefield. 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
In all countries engaged in war experience has sooner or later pointed out contracts with private men of substance and talents equal to the understanding as the cheapest, most certain and consequently the best mode of obtaining those articles, which are necessary for subsistence, covering, and moving of an Army. Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance February 1781
In the early years of the Revolutionary War, despite a one hundred-fifty year history of contractors providing supplies and transportation, the government ceased contracting. The decision was based on the contractors excessive profit margin and a suspicion in some circles that private contractors were under Tory influence. Instead, the initial means of sustaining the force was one of "direct purchasing" 8 by Army officers or agents of the government. However, under this system the overall management of providing service support was lacking and the direct purchase system was quickly replaced with a "system of specific supplies," 9 a state controlled system that proved inflexible to an army on the move. In 1781 the Continental Congress appointed Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance. He quickly replaced the direct purchase system and system of specific supplies with a system of private contractors.
Morris successfully incorporated private competition into the contracting process as a means to drive down costs. Unfortunately, it did not fix the problem as neither side could be convinced of the system's merits. The Army complained of profiteering and poor quality of goods provided while the contractors claimed abuses such as late or insufficient payments. 10 Although there were many problems associated with civilian contractor support, it was by far the most acceptable of the methods. The century ended with "mixed results in terms of performance and adequate support for the troops; lack of experience and expertise on the part of Army officers in dealing with contractors; lack of clarity in communications between the Army and supporting contractors as to requirements, capabilities, and costs; and financial manipulation and desire to increase profits at the expense of the Army on the part of the contractors."
11

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Following the War of 1812, not without problems, the Army established the Commissary
General of Subsistence in 1820 as the management arm for feeding its soldiers. In addition to the establishment of the Subsistence bureau, the nineteenth century also gave rise to the Army's Quartermaster, Medical, and Ordnance bureaus. With a certain level of success, they set out to reduce the dependence on civilian contractors, relying more on an organic capability to sustain the force. "Gradually, private contracting was supplanted by the growing system of government arsenals and manufactories and the development for procedures for centralized procurement from the expanding American industrial sector managed by the logistics bureaus of Army headquarters." 12 In a stationary fortress environment, the system proved most successful.
However, logisticians of the time found it very difficult to sustain an army on the move, giving rise once again to a dependence on contractors. As evidenced in 1845 and 1846 when troops were deployed to the War with Mexico, the Army's procurement system became over-taxed, particularly in the transportation and maintenance fields. This shortcoming led to over 400 contracts being placed for these type services. Many of the same contractor problems encountered in the eighteenth century were repeated. "The hiring of mechanics, teamsters and laborers was expensive, the supply of such workers uncertain, and their retention doubtful.
Moreover, contract teamsters proved difficult to control and generally resistant to Army discipline on the march and in camp."
13
The next major test bed for the logistical bureaus was the Civil War. Thanks in part to an abundance of unskilled labor in the North, the Army was not compelled to rely on contractors to the extent initial mobilization plans indicated. Instead, a workforce of freed slaves from the establish an habitual relationship with the military unit to provide expert advice and assistance on the maintenance of the system being employed. Additionally, the need to build and operate ordnance repair facilities in the Middle East and North Africa was a contractor mission.
However, the plan to contract the entire mission was shelved when senior Army leaders questioned the viability of such a decision. Not only were they concerned about duplication of effort, but in the contractor's supposed expertise in operating repair depots for communications, ordnance, engineer and other equipment as well. "More important than either of these considerations was the fact that there were inherent dangers in assigning to a civilian contractor tasks that were essentially military. The contractor might abandon the work, or the employees could leave when they saw fit. Civilian workers in a combat area might be captured, in which case they did not have the protection of military status, or they might be killed." 19 Furthermore, the Ordnance Corps argued that the sensitivity of these type operations, and the possibility of them being sabotaged was too vital a function to be left to civilians. 
20
KOREA AND VIETNAM
PROTECTING U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
Finding the right balance of military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors is subject to continuous evaluation and is the cornerstone of effective Army manpower management. It is readily apparent that we must define our total manpower requirements, to include a flexible workforce mix, in an integrated manner. This strategy will ensure that we can man our combat units at 100%, while transforming our Institutional Army to meet the future National Military Strategy. Assuring allies and friends of the United States steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulfill its security commitments;
Dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S.
interests or those of our allies and friends;
Deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary's military capability and supporting infrastructure; and Decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.
30
However comforting the verbs Assure, Dissuade, Deter, and Defeat may be, the resources in the existing force structure to make due with these promises are admittedly inadequate. The QDR is quick to point out that while the U.S. military remains the best trained, equipped, and capable force in the world, its readiness is degrading. In addition to an aging fleet of equipment that must be sustained to keep the tip of the spear razor sharp, the SECDEF sights a dramatic reduction in personnel since the end of the Cold War, yet an increase in the number of demands. 31 The major challenge alluded to earlier is integrating the strategies laid out by the President's NSS, the SECDEF's QDR, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) NMS. Once the strategies are integrated, the task is to formulate a credible joint vision that is properly resourced with personnel and equipment, and ensures success on tomorrow's battlefield. Under these conditions, the battlefield of the last half century is susceptible to losing its traditional characterisitics of having a secure rear area, with a forward edge of the battle area, and right, left, and rear boundaries. Sustaining the force on the future multi-dimensional future battlefield will not only require a concept of focused logistics and dominant maneuver that can keep pace with the operational tempo but it will also depend on a logistics force structure capable of operating between engagement areas, across extended and vulnerable lines of communication.
These operational concepts will be made possible through a real time, web-based information system providing accurate, actionable visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across joint forces, services, and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to systems, processes and organizations, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions." . Army regulations will almost certainly require change.
The new warfighting doctrine of quick and decisive, highly mobile operations in an asymmetrical and noncontiguous environment suggests that contractors will be required well forward, "effectively ending the concept of a safe division rear." 46 The enemy will almost assuredly continue to conduct strikes against targets to disrupt the flow of essential supplies to forward based units. Such was the case during the Persian Gulf War when an Iraqi Scud Missile fired into the enemy rear echelon, killing 28 U.S. Army reservists, 13 of whom were supporting a water purification mission. Currently, water purification missions are being performed by Brown As doctrine dictates, it is imperative the commander make every opportunity to exercise the contractor's ability to deploy and perform his duties during peacetime deployments. Here, the commander can assess the contractor's functional capabilities and make judgments on his physical and mental condition. 
THE CIVIL AUGMENTATION BRIDGE; A FORCE MULTIPLIER?
In an effort to augment CSS force structure, the Army currently employs three major Under the external support contract that will typically deploy as part of the force, as is the case with the AMC managed LOGCAP umbrella contract, the contractor is normally responsible for training the team, deploying to the area of operations, sustaining the team, and redeploying following conflict resolution. This is primarily due to the potential size of a LOGCAP contingent and the requirement for the contractor to be capable of receiving the military force at a rate of 1,500 per day, within fifteen days after notice to proceed. The LOGCAP contractor must be capable of supporting up to 25,000 personnel for up to 180 days, with an option to increase the size of the force to be supported to 50,000 personnel for up to 360 days. 56 Furthermore, the LOGCAP contractor is responsible for arranging all contractual agreements with the host nation.
If the contractor is responsible for deploying himself, this allows the commander during deliberate planning the opportunity to focus on the employment of combat forces to the AO during the TPFDD process. That said, care must be taken to ensure the contractor isn't competing with the military for the same potentially scarce resources such as aircraft, airfields, and a host of other logistical requirements.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT: A CORE COMPETENCY?
Forget logistics and you lose.
General Frederick Franks, Jr.
Determining whether or not a function was considered core or not was once a fairly simple decision. The rule of thumb was that if the task to be performed was combatant in nature, involved the possibility of putting one's life in danger as a result of armed conflict, or required a surge capability in the event of a national crisis, then the task was determined necessarily organic to the military; hence, a core capability. 57 Title 10 of the United States Code, Section
Government-owned and Government-operated in order to provide for the national defense. The issue is to then define those CSS capabilities that should be determined core. To assist in the process, Section 2464 of Title 10 elaborates on the issue by providing the following guidance.
Core logistics capabilities are those functions determined "necessary to maintain and repair the weapon systems and other military equipment." 58 Based on this definition, the obvious assumption must be that maintenance functions are considered inherently governmental and must therefore remain the responsibility of a DoD employee. However, due to the complexity of many military systems, coupled with the time it took to instruct both military and DAC technicians to learn how to repair the system(s) Some might argue that the tail is wagging the dog on the core competency issue.
Considering the information provided in the previous paragraph, one might surmise that the Congress and DoD are not coordinating their efforts very well. In accordance with Joint Pub 4-0, "The relative combat power that military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations." 61 Clearly, force projection, the ability to project and sustain the force is one of the military's principle centers of gravity, "those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." 62 However, due to force structure decisions imposed by the nation's leadership, to maintain its combat strength, the Army has divested itself of the responsibility to provide certain types of support such as the deployment of certain CSS assets to the theater of operations, possibly before the arrival of troops if the contractor has the reception, staging, onward movement and integration mission, as well as repairing and sustaining major weapon systems located virtually anywhere on a non-contiguous battlefield.
As 
LEGAL RISKS
What is the legal status of a DAC/contractor when deployed to an area of operations where hostilities are ongoing or imminent? Although the type support rendered may be very similar to that which a military member or unit might provide, their legal status is indeed fundamentally different. In the case of a contractor, he is only liable to work under the specifics of the contract. By the Geneva and Hague Conventions, a DAC, if wearing a uniform, can be considered a combatant by the enemy, is a legal target, and is eligible to prisoner of war status if captured. "The line between combatants and non-combatants is blurry, and it becomes virtually meaningless in MOOTW". 76 Of course, the rules aren't necessarily applicable when combating a nation or group(s) which is a not signatory to these conventions. When using contractors and DACs, the general policy is that civilian augmentation forces will typically be employed in echelons above division areas, and lower when determined absolutely necessary but not forward of the brigade support area. Commanders are responsible and accountable to ensure they avoid putting the contractor in a position that jeopardizes his status as a noncombatant. However, if the contractor gives the appearance to the enemy that they are providing support to the military force, particularly support that could be construed as offensive support, their status as a non-combatant is arguably in jeopardy. 77 If the terms of the contract allow the contractor, the non-combatant, to arm himself for the purpose of self-defense and he then chooses to use his weapon in other than a self-defense mode, his status as a noncombatant changes is subject to being changed to one of an illegal combatant. By the recognized laws of land warfare, he is in this case no longer afforded Prisoner of War status, becomes a valid military target, and is potentially subject to be tried for war crimes. A noncombatant's status would have to change to illegal combatant to commit a war crime. performance cannot be accurately predicted"
80
. As the nature of warfare changes, so too must doctrine governing the employment of the civilians on the battlefield. As military systems become more technical and require contractors further forward on the battlefield either to replace or operate the equipment, the individual's safety and status as a noncombatant is arguably jeopardized more than ever before. The support provided by the contractor accompanying the force is through a voluntary contractual agreement. Since the contractor is bound by contract and not by oath, he cannot be compelled to remain on the battlefield. The notion of having the contractor sign a pledge to do so would not hold up in court as it would constitute involuntary servitude. 81 Therefore, it is vital that the contractor's performance be exercised in peacetime to ensure he can meet the terms of the contract when called upon to deploy in support of a military operation.
CONCLUSION
The employment of DACs and contractors on the battlefield is a strategic decision. Based on the Army's decision to sacrifice the CSS tail for more tooth is the fact it has put itself in a position whereby it must now contract for a CSS capability it no longer has the internal ability to perform, but which is considered vital to mission success. In both stability and support operations, the use of contractors to provide combat service support may be more appropriate than deploying CSS soldiers. Constrained by troop caps so as not to give the appearance of an overwhelming show of military force, coupled with the desire to retain as much of the military CSS for potentially hostile contingencies on the horizon, civilians may be the combatant commander's preferred option for select service support missions performed in secure areas of the AO. The greater concern however, is not MOOTW type operations.
During armed conflict the entire issue of civilians on the battlefield takes on a new meaning. The manner by which the Army plans to prosecute future wars based on evolving doctrine that capitalizes on speed, surprise, lethality, technology, and information, be it in the Middle East or North East Asia, is changing. Once defined by boundaries, future conflicts are being characterized as nonlinear, asymmetrical and noncontiguous. This research has attempted to show that as a result of the changing nature of warfare, the Army must re-address its concept of employing contractors and DACs on future battlefields. The issue is not the provisioning of technologies from the contractor, but the dependence on the contractor to sustain and operate these critical systems in forward areas on the battlefield. The risk is not only to the civilian but to the combat forces who count on the proper support in the right place, in the correct quantity, and at the right time. "The issue of "Contractors on the Battlefield" is clearly bigger than any functional area, bigger than any Service, and perhaps bigger than DoD itself."
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